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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

;
;
]
Appellate Case No. 20081015

DANIEL LARRY,
Defendant.

]
]

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for one count of Illegal Possession or
Use of a Controlled Substance, a third-degree felony in violation of §58-37-8
(2)(a)(i), and one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor in violation of 58-37A-5. This court has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT I
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1,
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH

1

CONSTITUTION BY HIS ATTORNEY'S FAILINGS DURING
THE COURSE OF TRIAL?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a
matter of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective
assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two-part test, which was
adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether
counsel was ineffective. The Court held that;
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Id. at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693.
POINT II
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN NOT
SUA SPONTE SUPRESSING EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM
A SEARCH IN VIOLATION OF THE DEFENDANT'S
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was not preserved for appeal, but
should be ruled to be plain error. The Court would then review these prejudicial
statements under a plain error standard. In the case of State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d
1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994), this Court held, "Under [the plain error] standard,
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we will not reverse unless we determine that an error existed, and that the error
was both obvious and harmful".

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
SIXTH AMENDMENT
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law.
Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend
in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted
by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused
person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a
husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at
any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
Article I, Section 14.
warrant.]

[Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§58-37-8(2)(a)(i): Prohibited Acts
(2) Prohibited acts B - Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled
substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid
prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
§58-37A-5 Unlawful acts
(l)It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store,
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the drug
paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack,
repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a
controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act. Any person who
violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the person
making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) (a) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper,
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia.

(b) Any person who violates this Subsection (4) is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
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(5) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section,
notwithstanding a charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this
chapter.
§78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except
the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry,
Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of
the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and
Mining, and the state engineer;
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged by information with one count of Illegal
Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a third-degree felony, and one count
of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. (R. 5) The
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Defendant was tried before a jury on October 10, 2008, empanelled by the
Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan.

The jury found the Defendant guilty of all

charges. On November 18, 2009, the Defendant was sentenced to serve
concurrent terms of not to exceed five years at the Utah State Prison and six
months also at the Utah State Prison. The Defendant is currently serving this
term at the Utah State Prison.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Defendant was charged with possession or use of a controlled
substance and possession of drug paraphernalia after he was pulled out of the
backseat of a vehicle following the arrest of the driver. (R. 43) The Defendant
was a passenger of a vehicle that was pulled over because the vehicle was
operating without insurance. (R. 43) Officer Francom is the police officer that
stopped the car. (R. 43) There were three people in the car; the driver, Kendell
Spanger, and passenger, Michelle, and the Defendant in the driver-side backseat.
(R. 43, 49) Officer Francom arrested Spangler because of an outstanding warrant
from Layton P.D. for not having proof of insurance. After taking Spangler into
custody, Officer Francom ordered the Defendant and the other passenger out of
the car. (R. 43-44) He then proceeded to search the vehicle.
After ordering the Defendant out of the car, Officer Francom searched him
for weapons and placed him into custody. Officer Francom found no drugs,
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paraphernalia, or weapons on the Defendant. (R. 62) Officer Francom then
proceeded to search the vehicle for "contraband, weapons, anything that is illegal
and they shouldn't be in possession of." (R.62) During the search of the vehicle,
Officer Francom found a pipe used to smoke crack-cocaine which was located on
the seat where the Defendant had been sitting. (R. 44, 53) Officer Francom then
took the Defendant into custody, handcuffed him behind his back, and called for
an officer from the narcotics strike force to transport the Defendant to jail. (R.
67). Officer Francom later found another crack pipe on the seat of his patrol car.
(R. 61) Officer Grogan of the Weber/Morgan Narcotics Strike Force arrived on
the scene shortly thereafter and transported the Defendant to jail in his patrol car.
(R.67) After arriving at the jail, Officer Grogan got out of his patrol car to secure
his firearm in the trunk. (R.69) Officer Grogan then removed the Defendant from
the vehicle. (R. 69) Officer Grogan then found two small pieces of crack-cocaine
on the seat of his patrol car. (R. 69). After finding the pieces of cocaine, Officer
Grogan searched the Defendant and found a burnt piece of steel wool in his jacket
pocket. (R. 69)
The jury convicted the Defendant of all charges.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The overriding issue on appeal is that the Defendant was denied his right to
effective assistance of counsel. This ineffectiveness was manifest at numerous
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stages of the trial. First, counsel was apparently unaware of the fact that police
officers cannot search a vehicle after arresting the driver for a non-violent
offense. (See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct.1710; 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (April 21, 2009)).
The police can only search a vehicle if there is a reasonable cause to believe that
their safety is at issue. Counsel admitted during the trial that he felt the police had
the right to search a vehicle after the driver has been arrested. The driver was
arrested for a non-violent offense, and the police had no reason to suspect there
were weapons or contraband in the vehicle. No motions or objections were ever
filed against this unreasonable search and seizure. The trial court allowed this
evidence to be presented to the jury without conducting a Rule 403 analysis.
After the Defendant was removed from the car, he was arrested for
possession of drug paraphernalia, even though no physical evidence was found on
his person. It was not his car. Counsel never even questioned why the Defendant
was arrested when no physical evidence was found on him at this point. All of the
evidence from this search was admitted into evidence. Counsel never attempted to
object to their legality or file any motions to suppress the evidence.
Finally, the cumulative effect of these errors and defective representation
resulted in prejudice to the Defendant and undermined the fundamental fairness
of his trial.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1,
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION BY HIS ATTORNEY'S FAILING DURING
THE COURSE OF TRIAL.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to counsel
is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984).

In Strickland, the

Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's
assistance was ineffective.

"First, the defendant must show that counsel's

performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674.

In making that assessment, the Court in Strickland v. Washington gave
some guidance in noting, "The proper measure of attorney performance remains
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." (Id. at 688)
Although the Court in Strickland did not "exhaustively define the obligations of
counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance" (Id.
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at 688), it did mention certain minimal requirements. Additionally, the
overreaching requirement by the Supreme Court in ineffective assistance of
counsel cases is that the "performance inquiry must be whether counsel's
assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.55 (Id. at 688) See also
Kimmelman v. Morrison, All U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986)
and Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471, (U.S.
2003)
The Utah Appellate Courts have adopted the Strickland test and have
likewise rendered decisions in ineffective assistance of counsel cases that can
guide a determination of when a defense attorney fails in his appointed duties.
In the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), this
Court held that the failure of trial counsel to object to a Fourth Amendment
violation constituted reversible ineffective assistance of counsel error. The Court
held that, "where a defendant can show that there was no conceivable legitimate
tactical basis for counsel's deficient actions, the first prong of Strickland is
satisfied." (Id. at 976, quoting State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 359 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).)
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In several recent memorandum decisions,1 the Utah Court of Appeals has
reversed cases based on obvious ineffective assistance claims. In the recent
memorandum decision of State v. Scuderi, 2004 WL 2821676 (Utah App.), 2004
UT App 464, the Court reversed the conviction of a defendant whose counsel had
failed to move to dismiss under the Utah Speedy Trial Statute when it was clear
the case had not been brought to trial within the 120-day limit. In the case of State
v. Nelson, 2004 WL 2610521 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 421, the Court reversed
the conviction of a defendant whose counsel failed to file alibi notices on two
material witnesses for the defense. This failure was held to meet both prongs of
the Strickland test and required reversal. In the case of State v. Bleazsard, 2004
WL 2250908 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 351, the Court of Appeals reversed, on
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, a conviction obtained where the defense
attorney failed to notify the state of two witnesses who would have testified as to
the alleged rape victim's prior false claim of rape against one of the witnesses.
In the reported case of State v. Ison, 2004 UT App 252, f 23, 96 P.3d 374,
the Court again addressed the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel where trial
counsel failed to move to admit into evidence a previous finding by an
Administrative Law Judge that contained admissible exculpatory evidence. The

1

While defendant recognizes the Court's caution in use of memorandum
decisions, these cited cases demonstrate the obviousness of some Sixth
Amendment failings.
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Court further found trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's
instruction to the jury that was incorrect.
In State v. Bennett, 2000 UT 34, f 13, 999 P.2d 1, Justice Durham, in a
concurring opinion noted:
This court's supervisory power is an inherent power which has been
recognized in many cases. See, e.g., State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439,
442 (Utah 1996) (noting, in ineffective assistance of counsel case),
that "pursuant to our inherent supervisory power over the courts, we
may presume prejudice in circumstances where it is unnecessary and
ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case inquiry to weigh actual
prejudice"
Defense counsel's error in the present case was glaringly obvious to any
observer.

His failure to object to and have a hearing on the seizure and

subsequent illegal search of the Defendant clearly showed a deficiency. In
Kimmelman v. Morrison, infra., the court found reversible error in a case where
trial counsel realized a Fourth Amendment issue, but brought it to the court's
attention in an untimely manner. That untimely motion alone constituted
reversible error. In State v. Gallegos, infra., the Court found error in trial
counsel's failure to renew a previously denied motion to suppress. In the present
case, counsel, as in Kimmelman, failed to make a timely motion to suppress a
Fourth Amendment violation. However, unlike counsel in Kimmelman or in
Gallegos, trial counsel in the case at bar was so deficient that he never even
recognized that a Fourth Amendment question was at issue.
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Furthermore, "Counsel's performance at trial ... suggests no better
explanation for this apparent and pervasive failure." (Kimmelman) To the
contrary, there is absolutely no conceivable reason for defense counsel not to
make a pre-trial motion to suppress this evidence. Since this motion should have
been brought prior to trial, even the possible fear of somehow prejudicing the jury
would be non-existent obliterating any claim that there could have been a trial
strategy in not raising this issue.
The second prong of the two-part test articulated in Strickland is, "the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693.
In Strickland, the Court held that "[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to
justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d
182 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that to meet the second part of the
Strickland test a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Id. at 187(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466
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U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). In making the determination that counsel was ineffective,
the appellate court should "consider the totality of the evidence, taking into
account such factors as whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or
have an isolated effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record."
Id.
Likewise, in the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 981 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998), the court found prejudicial error in failing to object to the admission
of a tin canister that contained drugs, which was found during an illegal search. In
that case the court held: "Because the evidence found in the tin was essential to
the State's case on [drug possession] charges, admission of that evidence was
obviously prejudicial to defendant."
In the present case, the error by defense counsel encompasses the "entire
evidentiary picture". If trial counsel had raised the illegal seizure issue, and if the
trial court had correctly ruled on that issue, all of the evidence obtained after such
violation would have been suppressed. In this case, that means the entirety of the
evidence that supported defendant's conviction. This prong would therefore
require an analysis as to the constitutionality of the search and seizure in the
present case. This claim will be more fully argued and supported in point II
below.
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When the totality of the circumstances is considered it is clear that the
Defendant did not receive the type of assistance necessary to justify confidence in
the outcome of the trial.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN NOT
SUA SPONTE SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE OBTAINED
FROM A SEARCH IN VIOLATION OF THE DEFENDANT'S
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as
Article 1 Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah provide in relevant
part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated" The
Courts on both the state and federal level have defined when a seizure is
unreasonable.
The Supreme Court in the case of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) held:
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210; United States v. Lee,
274 U. S. 559, 563. But what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.
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The general rule regarding warrantless searches was established in the case
of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in which the Supreme Court set forth a
three-prong test in determining whether an individual is seized and what type of
search is permitted under various types of seizures.
In the recent case of State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, 661 (Utah 2002), the
Utah Supreme Court defined once again its' long-standing position on
permissible levels of seizures. In Hansen, the Court defined these levels as
follows:
A level-one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is a
consensual encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to noncoercive questioning by an officer. Id. Since the encounter is
consensual, and the person is free to leave at any point, there is no
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Royer, 460
U.S. at 498-99.
A level-two encounter involves an investigative detention that is
usually characterized as brief and non-intrusive. United States v.
Evans, 937 F.2d 1534, 1537 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Werking, 915
F.2d at 1407 (noting a level-two encounter is an investigative
detention or "Terry stop"). Although it is a Fourth Amendment
seizure, probable cause is not required. Evans, 937 F.2d at 1537.
Rather, when "specific and articulable facts and rational inferences ...
give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a
crime," an officer may initiate an investigative detention without
consent. Werking, 915 F.2d at 1407.
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A level-three encounter involves an arrest, which has been
"characterized [as a] highly intrusive or lengthy detention [that]
requires probable cause." Id. A level three encounter is also a Fourth
Amendment seizure. IdL

The Utah Court of Appeals in the case of State v. Valenzuela, 37 P.3d 260
(Ut. Ct. App. 2001) reversed a defendant's conviction where he was stopped in a
public bank based upon a tip from an unknown informant that the defendant had
committed a forgery. The defendant was arrested and a search revealed a
controlled substance. The Court determined that a reasonable officer under the
circumstances could not have had reasonable suspicion to believe that the
defendant had committed an offense therefore the seizure was unconstitutional.
In further defining when a stop crosses the line from level-one to level-two,
the Court, in the case of State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah Ct. App.
1997), stated:
The distinction between a level-one encounter (a purely consensual
encounter) and a level-two encounter (a seizure requiring reasonable
suspicion) depends on whether, through a show of physical force or
authority, a person believes his freedom of movement is restrained.
See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870,
1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980).
In State v. Valdez 68 P.3d 1052, 1059 (Utah App. Ct. 2003), the court was
presented with a case where the police officers were executing an arrest warrant
on an individual. That individual requested that the officers allow her to go into
her bedroom to put on some weather appropriate clothing.
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The officers

accompanied the individual into her bedroom, at which point they discovered a
male individual (the defendant) lying on the bed with his hands obscured from the
officers view.

The officers, in an attempt to insure their safety, woke the

individual, discovered that he had nothing in his hand, and yet proceeded to
request his identification. The defendant originally told the officers that he did
not have any identification; and then, when asked, proceeded to give the officers a
false name. Upon discovering that the false name and been given, the officers
arrested the defendant; and in a search incident to arrest, discovered
methamphetamine. The trial court suppressed all the evidence, and the Utah
Court of Appeals affirmed that suppression with a holding as follows:
The trial court found, and we are not presented with a factual basis to
disturb its finding, that nothing supported the officers' investigation
into Valdez's identity during the detention. The trial court further
found that no articulable facts existed to support a reasonable
suspicion that Valdez was involved in any criminal activity.
Therefore, Robinson's request for Valdez's identification, or, absent
that, information concerning his identity, exceeded the scope of the
reason justifying the initial detention and unnecessarily expanded its
duration and scope. Thus, we conclude that the trial court correctly
suppressed any evidence gathered from that point forward. (Id, at
1059)
In the present case there is simply no reason for the officer's actions in
first, requiring the Defendant to leave the vehicle; second, handcuffing the
Defendant; and third, performing Terry Frisk of the Defendant. It is informative
to note that the driver of the vehicle was originally pulled over for no insurance
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on the vehicle and subsequently arrested for another no insurance warrant. There
is absolutely no reason for an objective reasonable officer to believe that there
were any drugs, or weapons in the vehicle. There was no reason for the officer to
detain the Defendant, place the Defendant into handcuffs, and conduct a Terry
Frisk of the Defendant given those circumstances. This is precisely the type of
case that screams out to a trial judge that there has been a significant violation of
a defendant's constitutional rights.
In the case of New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) the police officer
searched the vehicle after smelling a strong odor of marijuana after making a
traffic stop. The officer found a large quantity of marijuana after making the stop.
The Supreme Court ruled that police can search the passenger compartment and
of a vehicle and any containers therein as a contemporaneous incident of a recent
occupant's lawful arrest—on the ground that is concerned the scope of a search
incident to arrest. The Court said such searches have long been considered valid
because of the need 'to remove any weapons that the arrestee might seek to use in
order to resist arrest or effect his escape' and the need to prevent the concealment
or destruction of evidence" Id. at 457. Belton, however, renewed the principle of
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, "[the] scope of [a] search must be 'strictly tied to
and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.
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In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) the police came to Chimel's
home with an arrest warrant to arrest him for an alleged burglary. When he
returned from work, police arrested him. Police then asked for permission to
"look around." Even though Chimel objected, the officers conducted a search.
They looked through the entire house and had petitioner's wife open drawers and
physically remove contents of the drawers so they could view items. Police seized
a number of coins and medals, among other things, that respondent State later
used to convict petitioner of burglary. The Supreme Court overturned the
conviction ruling that the search was unreasonable. Absent a warrant, the only
reasonable place the officers should have searched was the room in which the
arrest took place. Chimel requires that a search incident to arrest be justified by
either the interest in officer safety or the interest in preserving evidence.
A lawful custodial arrest creates a situation which justifies the
contemporaneous search without a warrant of the person arrested and
of the immediately surrounding area. Such searches have long been
considered valid because of the need 'to remove any weapons that
[the arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape' and the need to prevent the concealment or destruction of
evidence. Id. at 763.
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Similarly, the case of Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004)
explains that searches incident to arrest are only justified when it is reasonable to
believe that evidence of the crime will be found or when the safety of the officers
are at stake:
When officer safety or imminent evidence concealment or destruction
is at issue, officers should not have to make fine judgments in the heat
of the moment. But in the context of a general evidence-gathering
search, the state interests that might justify any overbreadth are far
less compelling. A motorist may be arrested for a wide variety of
offenses; in many cases, there is no reasonable basis to believe
relevant evidence might be found in the car. I would therefore limit
Belton searches to cases where it is reasonable to believe evidence
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle. Id. at 632

Perhaps the most relevant and applicable case was handed down by the
United States Supreme Court just over two months ago, Arizona v. Gant, 129
S.Ct.1710; 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (April 21, 2009). This is case where Gant, the
defendant, was arrested for driving on a suspended license. He was subsequently
handcuffed, and locked in a patrol car. After taking Gant into custody the police
officers searched his car and found cocaine in a jacket pocket located in the
backseat of the car. The Supreme Court ruled that the search violated Gant's
Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court
held that Gant was simply a comingling of Chimel and Belton: "Accordingly, we
hold that Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent
occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior
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of the vehicle... we conclude that circumstances unique to the automobile context
justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of
the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle." Gant at 1714
The Defendant recognizes the relatively high bar he must clear as set forth
in State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994), where this Court held,
"Under [the plain error] standard, we will not reverse unless we determine that an
error existed, and that the error was both obvious and harmful". Notwithstanding
that high bar, the Defendant believes that the obviousness of the facts should have
made it clear to any trial court that a violation of the Defendant's Fourth
Amendment constitutional rights had been significantly implicated. The
Defendant was arrested after Officer Francom began to search the vehicle
Spangler had been driving. There was no reason to assume that the Defendant
was dangerous or posed a threat to the officer's safety. Spangler was arrested
because of failure to pay a fine to the Layton Police Department for not having
proof of insurance, a class B misdemeanor. Officer Francom had no reason to fear
for his safety because Spangler had already been secured in his patrol car. He had
no reasonable reason to assume that there was a threat because of the nature of
Kendall's offense. Not having proof of insurance is not a threat to officer safety.
Officer Francom certainly did not have the right to search for "contraband,
weapons, anything that is illegal and they shouldn't be in possession of." (R.62)
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Aside from his own safety, the only other legitimate reason to search the vehicle
is to prevent the arrestee from tampering with evidence. Spangler was arrested
because of an outstanding warrant, therefore there was no evidence to be
tampered with.
The Defendant should never have even been ordered from the car. Kendall
Spangler was arrested because of an outstanding warrant for failure to pay fine in
another jurisdiction. Officer Francom had no reason to feel threatened or that his
safety was in question. The arrest was from a warrant and not from any
immediate offense; therefore there was no evidence to be obtained from the
vehicle; and as such, there was no justifiable reason to search to perform a search
incident to arrest. Officer's Francom's actions violated the Defendant's Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, there can be no question that the Defendant did
not receive a fair trial. The combination of ineffective assistance of counsel and
the introduction at trial of evidence which violated the Defendant's constitutional
rights resulted in a conviction that does not meet the standards required by this
Court. The cumulative effect of the improperly offered and admitted evidence
and the ineffective assistance of counsel in this case can only be cured by a
reversal and remand for a new trial.
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ADDENDUM A

NOV 2 \ 2008
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEK
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SECOND
DISTRICT COURT,

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
APP SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs .

Case No: 071901240 FS

DANIEL B LARRY,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
November 18, 2 0 08

PRESENT
Clerk:
roxanneb
Prosecutor: MILES, BRANDEN B
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MARTIN GRAVIS, PDA
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: April 8, 194 9
Video
Tape Number:
3C 111808
Tape Count: 312-315
CHARGES
ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/10/2008 Guilty
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition; 10/10/2008 Guilty
HEARING
This is the time set for sentencing. Defendant is present in
custody from the Weber County Jail. Defendant is represented by
Martin Gravis. The Court hears from counsel and proceeds with
sentencing.

071901240 LARRY,DAN!EL B
Page 1

Case No: 071901240
Date:
Nov 18, 2 0 08
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in
the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The Court orders the sentence imposed on each count to run
concurrent with each other. The jail sentence shall be served at
the Utah State Prison.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
The Court orders the defendant receive credit for time served at
the Weber County Jail from 10/10/08.
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE
COURTLAND CRAIG JR PRINCE
CHARLES DANIEL LARRY
TOM LEWIS
WILLARD STAWSKI
CHARLIE LARRY
CRAIG PRINCE
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